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personal obligation to interpose a right of action which his firm has against the plaintiff, depends upon his right to sue upon the firm claim.24
Where, however, all members of the partnership are parties to the original suit,
either as plaintiffs or defendants, the only obstacle to the pleading of counterclaims,
under the liberal practice established by the new Federal Rules, would seem to be the
practical considerations of trial convenience and possible prejudice to the parties.
Rule 13(a) provides that any cause of action arising out of the transaction which forms
the basis of the plaintiff's complaint must be pleaded by the defendant; 2s since a counterclaim offered under this provision will usually raise issues closely connected with
those presented by the complaint, the avoidance of duplication which would result
from separate trials would seem to outweigh any disadvantages the parties might suffer
from the joinder. On the other hand, Rule 13 (b) permits the defendant to counterclaim any other cause of action which he has against an opposing party. 6 Since a
counterclaim offered under this provision may involve matters entirely foreign to the
complaint, presentment of complicated and unrelated issues to the jury may seriously
prejudice parties not otherwise concerned with the defendant's cause of action. This
would seem to present a proper situation for the exercise of the court's power of
severance under Rule 42(b).2 7 While the report of the opinion in the instant case fails
to disclose the substantive nature of the counterclaims pleaded, the court evidently
felt that the issues which they raised were suffciently connected with those presented
by the complaint to justify a settlement of all claims in one trial.
Procedure-Federal Venue Statute--Appointment of Agent for Service of Process
Pursuant to State Law as Waiver of Improper Venue-[Federal].-The complainants,
stockholders in United Shipyards Incorporated, brought suit against that company,
certain of its officers, and theBethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation. Complainants
were citizens of New Jersey, Bethlehem was a Delaware corporation, and all other
defendants were residents of New York. Suit was brought in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York where Bethlehem had its main executive offices and
where it had appointed an agent for service of process to fulfill the requirements of the
New York corporation law., Bethlehem moved to quash the service of process on the
ground of non-compliance with Section Si of the Judicial Code' which provides:
...... where jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens
of different states, suit shall be brought only in the district of residence of either the
plaintiff or the defendant ..... " On certiorari from an affirmance3 of an order dis24McGuire v. Lamb, 2 Idaho 378, 17 Pac. 749 (1888); Hallam v. Henkin, 31 S.D. 637, 141
N.W. 784 (1913); Heinrich v. Kirby, 64 Mont. 1, 208 Pac. 897 (1922).
2SNote ig supra.
26 Note o supra.
27Rule 42(b): "The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a
separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third party claim ..... "
N.Y.L. 1892, c. 687, pp. z8os-6; substantially reenacted in N.Y. Gen'l Corp. Law §210.
'49 Stat. 1213 (i936), 28 U.S.C.A. § 112 (Supp. 1939). For comment on the effect of the
instant case on construction of other federal venue statutes (listed in 3 Moore, Federal Practice § io5 (1938)) see Federal Venue Requirements for Foreign Corporations, 49 Yale L. J.
724, 726, 729 (1940)3Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., io3 F. (2d) 765 (C.C.A. 2d 1939).
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missing the suit as to Bethlehem, held, the designation by a foreign corporation pursuant to a state law of an agent on whom process may be served amounts to a "consent
to be sued" in that state and a waiver of the venue privileges of the federal statute.
Reversed and remanded. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.4
Under the first judiciary Acts suit based on diversity of citizenship might be brought
in the district of residence of either the plaintiff or defendant, or in the district in which
service of process was had upon the defendant. By judicial decision a defendant also
became subject to suit in any district in which he had consented to be sued.6 When
states enacted laws requiring citizens of other states and foreign corporations doing
business within their borders to appoint agents for service of process, 7 the question
arose whether compliance with such a statute subjected a non-resident to suit in the
federal court of the district of residence of the agent which is appointed.
In Ex parte Schollenberger8 the United State Supreme Court held that service upon
an agent actually appointed pursuant to such a state law gave the federal court personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant and that by consenting to service of
process within the state the corporation had "consented to be found" within the
district for the purposes of federal venue. After the deletion of the clause of the
judiciary Act which had permitted suits in any district in which the defendant could be
found and served,9 the Supreme Court held upon several occasions that a corporation
could not be sued in a state in which it was doing business and had appointed an agent
for service of process.10 The pressure of business on overburdened federal courts was
probably one reason for these decisions. x
At the present time, the volume of federal litigation has been much reduced.2 It is
therefore practical to permit a greater number of litigants to take advantage of the
procedure and supposed greater competence of federal tribunals.3 The Supreme
46o S.Ct. 153 (1939) followed in Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co.,
6o S.Ct. 215 (1939).
s i Stat. 79 (1789).

parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369 (1877); Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge, i51 U.S.
(1894); Interior Construction Co. v. Gibney, 16o U.S. 217 (1895); Commercial Ins. Co. v.
Stone Co., 278 U.S. 77 (1929); cf. United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. i (x915).
7 Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law, c. 5
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(1918).

8 96 U.S. 369 (1877).
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Stat. 552 (1887);

1o Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., r45 U.S. 444

25

Stat. 434 (r888).

Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146
U.S. 202 (1892); In re Kceasbey & Mattison Co., 16o U.S. 221 (i895). These cases were followed in the lower court decisions cited in the opinion of the principal case, 6o S. Ct. 157,
note i6. The Schollenberger case continued to be good law insofar as it held that service of
process on an agent of corporation appointed pursuant to state law gave a federal district
court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
xxIn i89o there were 1816 cases pending before the Supreme Courtand 54,194 cases pending
before the lower federal courts. Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court
6o (1927).
12 Frankfurter and Landis, op. cit. supra note ii, at cc. 2, 3, 5-7. Moreover the overruling
of Swift v. Tyson, i6 Pet. (U.S.) x (1842) by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (i938)
may further decrease the business of the federal judiciary.
13 See generally 31 Mich. L. Rev. 6o-5 (1932); 38 Col. L. Rev. 1472-84 (1938).
(1892);
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Court's decision in the instant case marks a first step in the extension of such permission. No longer will a corporation of one state doing business in a second state and
having officers who are residents of the state in which it is doing business have any real
4
option to bar a resident of a third state from suing it and its officers in a federal court.
Nor will a corporation organized in one state and doing business in a second state, have
discriminatory advantages in determining the place of trial when it is suing or being
sued by a resident of the second state.'s On the contrary the present decision will have
the opposite effect of discriminating against a corporation organized in one state and
doing business in another; non-residents of the state in which the corporation is doing
business will have the unrestricted right to sue the corporation in the federal courts of
the state in which it is doing business; conversely the corporation will not be able to
sue such non-residents in the federal courts of the state in which it is doing business
unless they consent to the suit.
The Supreme Court reached the result in the present case on the theory that the
corporation by doing business in New York and appointing an agent there for service
of process had "consented to be sued" in New York. As applied here the consent theory is subject to all the theoretical objections which caused its abandonment as a
rationale in suits against foreign corporations in state courts.V 6 In the principal case
the corporation had actually appointed an agent on whom process could be served and
had thereby given some kind of consent; but the problem will arise whether a corporation will be deemed to have consented to be sued in the federal district courts of a state
in which it is doing business if the corporation statute of such state merely provides
that service upon the secretary of state shall bind foreign corporations doing business
within the state. Moreover, the New York courts have interpreted the designation of
an agent as a "true contract" permitting suit in New York;'7 should a state court assert
that a corporation by appointing an agent for service of process submits to state regulation, but does not "contract" to appoint an agent for service, 8 the basis of the present
decision might well be deemed inapplicable. The inability of the state to exclude cor14 Compare the situation in Platt v. Massachusetts Real Estate Co., io3 Fed. 7o5 (C.C.
Mass. i9oo).
ISUnder the former rule a corporation organized in State I and doing business in State II
might sue a resident of State II in either the state or federal courts of State II; and if it were
sued by a resident of State II in the state courts of State II, it might at its option remove to
the federal courts of State UI. Similarly the resident of State I1 might sue the corporation in
either the state or federal courts of State I, and if sued by the corporation in State I might remove to the federal courts of State I. Since the convenience of both the resident of State I1
and the corporation organized in State I and doing business in State II would generally be best
served by suit in State II, most suits between the resident and the corporation would doubtless
be maintained in State I1. Such being true, the corporation doubtless had the opportunity of
determining in a majority of cases whether suit should be maintained in the state or federal
courts.
16 Henderson, op. cit. supra note 7, at c. 5; Cahill, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations
and Individuals Who Carry on Business within the Territory, 3o Harv. L. Rev. 676 (z917);
Scott, Jurisdiction over Non-Residents Doing Business within the State, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871
(919).
'7Bagdon v. Philadelphia &Reading Coal &Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432, ii N.E. 1075 (ii6).
'8 See, e.g., Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Griflin, 226 Ky. 159, 10 S.W. (2d) 633 (1928).
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porations doing an interstate business,19 makes the consent theory inappropriate as a
basis for suit against them in the federal courts, unless they have filed actual consent
to be sued. If the foreign corporation accompanies its appointment of an agent for
service of process with a stipulation that it does not thereby intend to waive its
privileges of federal venue, will this stipulation affect the right to bring suit against it
in the federal courts? Does thi consent to be sued apply to all causes of action or only
to those which arose out of business done in the state requiring the appointment?2" Or
can appointment pursuant to state law of an agent for service of process amount to
waiver of improper venue in actions of which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction?20A If the appointment of an agent for service of process is a real consent to
be sued in the district, a non-resident individual who has been forced by the state law
to appoint an agent within the state for service of process" would also be subject to suit
in the federal district courts of the state.
The Supreme Court might have reached the same result that it did in the present
case by reverting to the theory, adopted formerly by some lower federal courts, 22 that
the corporation is a resident of a state in which it does business and appoints an agent
for service of process. This theory would have correctly described the fact situation of
a foreign corporation doing business within a state. Its adoption might, however, pre23
vent the foreign corporate defendant from removing a case to the federal courts.
Moreover, under the residence theory, unlike under the consent theory, a foreign
corporation would have the unrestricted right to sue non-residents of the state in
4
which it was doing business in the federal courts of that state.
19 Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877).
20 Compare Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907); Simon v.
Southern R. Co., 236 U.S. Ui5 (1915) with Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining
Co., 243 U.S. 93 (,917).
20&
For an enumeration of such actions see 28 U.S.C.A. § 371 (1928).

"zCf. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (i935) (service upon an ordinary agent
where statute did not require designation of an agent).
-Zambrino v. Galveston, H. & S.A.R. Co., 38 Fed. 449 (D.C. Tex. 1880); Riddle v. New
York, L.E. & W.R. Co., 39 Fed. 290 (C.C. Pa. i889); Consolidated Store-Service Co. v. Lamson Consolidated Store-Service Co., 41 Fed. 833 (C.C. Mass. 189o); Shainwald v. Davids, 69
Fed. 704 (D.C. Cal. 1895); United States v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 49 Fed. 297 (C.C. Cal.

1892), all overruled by cases cited in note io supra.
2338 Stat. 278 (1914), 28 U.S.C.A. § 7, (1927); 3 Moore, Federal Practice § 1010.5 (1938).
24For elaboration of this point see last sentence of first full paragraph on page 399. This
distinction may explain the adoption by the instant case of the "consent" rationale, rather
than the "residence" rationale: there has been a widespread movement to remove suits by
and again-st foreign corporations from the federal courts. See Federal Venue Requirements for
Foreign Corporations, 49 Yale L.J. 724, 729 n. 34, 732 n. 46 (i94o). The movement, however,

was initiated by those who objected to the privileges of foreign corporations to sue in the
federal courts. Ibid., at 729 n. 34. Such groups would presumably prefer the present decision
to one which by adopting the "residence" rationale would permit a foreign corporate plaintiff to found venue in a diversity of citizenship cases on the fact that it was doing business
within a given district.

